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I.  Introduction 
 
This paper is concerned with identifying the main costs that violent conflict has had for 
human development in Colomiba, El Salvador and Guatemala.  A first section refers to 
the difficulties involved in measuring these costs, taking into account different 
measurement methods, statistical problems and intangible costs.  The second part of the 
paper briefly describes the basic characteristics of conflict in Colombia, El Salvador and 
Guatemala.  The third part then identifies the impact of violent conflict on human 
development in these countries, with emphasis on economic and social development, 




II.  Methodological issues 
 
1.  Counterfactual 
 
What would have happened had there not been a violent conflict?    This is normally a 
crucial question that needs to be dealt with when measuring the costs of violent conflict.  
Determining what would have happened if there had not been conflict is the 
counterfactual world (“anti-mondo”) to which what actually occurred needs to be 
compared.  The difference between the (peaceful) counterfactual situation and the 
(violent) actual situation can then be attributed to conflict. 
 
Two basic methods, with variants, can be used to compare both situations.  The most 
common one is to characterize the violent period that is being analyzed and, on the basis 
of this characterization, determine the potential effects of violent conflict during this 
period.  Once the basic traits of this period have been identified, their effects are 
assigned costs.
1  This is basically an accounting method, and the implicit counterfactual 
world is that everything would have continued being the same had it not been for 
violent conflict.  The problem with this type of analysis is that the negative (or positive) 
effects of changes of other variables, like an external shock, are not taken into account, 
and by not doing so the effect of violent conflict can be magnified (or understated).   
 
The second method consists in simulating, through an econometric model, a country’s 
economic growth.   To the extent that a country departs from the path predicted by the 
model this can be accounted for by violent conflict or, alternatively, variables 
representing conflict can be built into the model and simulations can be made including 
                                                 
1 The identification of costs made by the Guatemalan Truth Commission is of this type.  See CEH (1999), 
chapter V. or excluding the effect of these variables.
2  The problem with this approach is that 
models of this type typically refer only to economic growth and, furthermore, are 
subject to serious theoretical and empirical criticisms.
3 
 
A variant of the first method is to compare the evolution of the country or countries 
with violent conflict to other countries in similar situations without violent conflicts.  In 
this case the counterfactual situation is in fact the situation of the other (non-violent) 
countries.  In this case there is less danger of excluding the effects of other variables if 
the other countries are similar to the one that is being analyzed or if (through an 
econometric exercise) the effects of these variables are calculated and isolated so as to 
avoid being confused with the causes or effects of violence.   An increasing number of 
studies have been made recently applying this methodology, basically comparing 
countries that have suffered civil wars with those that have not.
4  A limitation of this 
approach is that even if the conclusions apply to a wide set of conflicts as a whole, there 
may be specific cases, like those being analyzed in this paper, in which they do not. 
 
In practice, a combination of these methods is advisable, trying to carefully take into 
account “other effects” in the case of the first accounting method, recognizing that the 
second method of individual country modeling may only be a very broad and tentative 
approximation of the actual costs of violent conflict, and identifying specific traits of 
conflict in particular countries so as to be able to determine if general conclusions 
resulting from the comparison of countries with violent conflict to those which are 
peaceful are applicable to particular cases. 
 
2.  Intangible costs 
 
Most costs are tangible, but a few are not.  Social capital, trust, the capacity to 
cooperate, “agency” (the individual or collective capacity of persons to define their life 
style) or the weakness of the state are all crucial ingredients of development but are very 
difficult to measure.  They therefore tend to be left out in measurement exercises.  This 
also tends to happen with variables that econometric models have difficulty to include, 
like displaced persons or refugees, destroyed homes, impacts at a local level or the 
effects of conflict on mental health.   
 
Furthermore, there are costs that are long lasting, that do not cease to exist with the end 
of violent conflict, including some of those mentioned above.  This may be the case of 
processes that involve switching behavior based on expectations of honesty to behavior 
based on expectations of corruption and violence, a common effect of violent conflict 







                                                 
2 There are several studies of this type on the Colombian conflict.  For a review see Riascos and Vargas 
(2004). 
3 Specifically, determining the effect of trade liberalization or of institutions on growth is the object of 
tremendous controversy.  
4 See, for instance, Collier, P. and A. Hoefler,  (2001); and Pottenbaum and Kanbur,  (2004) 
5 World Bank (2003), p.21 3.  Statistical problems 
 
Statistical problems abound.  First, there is a general problem of data availability.  The 
geographical concentration of most conflicts requires disaggregated data that is not 
available at a regional level, especially to establish a base line. This problem is related 
to the one traditional limitations of average or national figures.  This may be a very 
serious limitation.  Specifically, studies based on national indicators of inequality have 
not been able to conclude that conflict is related to inequality,
6 whereas studies that 
have disaggregated data at a municipal or local level have found a relationship between 
both variables.
7    
 
Furthermore, violent conflict itself often results in deteriorating statistics, both at a 
national (lack of funds and weakening national statistical institutes) and regional (i.e. 
destruction of local administrative records) level.  The logic of conflict and war may 
also result in outright falsification of statistics, especially of those associated with public 
expenditure, including expenditure on defense, or on statistics that become part of the 
propaganda strategies associated with wars.   
 
All these problems may reinforce each other to the extent that a government in a 
situation of violent conflict may not wish to produce statistics –already in the process of 
being discontinued or destroyed- which may provide evidence of a deteriorating socio 
economic situation.  This can be further complicated in cases in which certain concepts, 
like direct and indirect costs, are not used with any great precision. 
 
A different problem arises from the difficulty of measuring violent conflict, since as a 
result of the variety of forms it may take (assassinations, kidnapping, destruction of 
infrastructure, violent demonstrations, etc.) no single indicator would appear to be 
appropriate.  This is further complicated by the fact that many statistics of these forms 
of violence are either non-existent or very tentative.  In Colombia a solution to the 
complexity problem was found by identifying the rate of homicides as an indicator of 
violent conflict, and the Human Development Index was adjusted by taking into account 
this indicator.  But the availability of statistics still points out to the necessary caution 
with which sophisticated models may be used, since often basic statistical requirements 
cannot be met.  And in many cases available data must be used imaginatively, though 
this obviously endangers the technical rigor of the analysis undertaken. 
 
Another problem results from varying intensities, lengths and location of violent 
conflicts within countries.  Conflicts such as those in Colombia and Guatemala have 
been long and had different intensities at different times and in different regions.   
According to Collier and Hoefler a workable definition of a civil war is an internal 
conflict with at least 1,000combat related deaths per year, where rebel organizations 
must suffer at least 5% o these casualties.
8   Conflicts in Colombia (from 1984 to the 
present), El Salvador (from 1979 to 1992) and Guatemala (first from 1966 to 1972 and 
then from 1978 to 1984) fulfill this definition.    
 
However, this does not take into account that the geographical (regional) locus of a 
conflict may change over time, as it did in Guatemala, first having concentrated in the 
                                                 
6 Collier and Hoeffler (2001) 
7 Barron, Kai and Menno (2004) and Sarmiento (2001) 
8 Collier and Hoefler (2001). eastern region and later in the north western regions, involving different intensities at 
different times. This is further complicated by the fact that many social indicators, 
especially at a national level, are not designed so as to take into account rapid and 
localized changes.  This is the case of life expectancy, for instance. 
 
4.  The role of the State 
 
Different assumptions regarding the role of the state may result in different estimates of 
costs.  Destruction of different types of capital normally result form violent conflict, yet 
it may also be argued that a government’s military expenditure may be needed precisely 
to reduce the destruction of capital stock produced by rebel forces.  In this case there is 
a trade off between public expenditure required to defend a country’s capital stock as 
opposed to public expenditure on health and education.  But if the state itself has been 
the cause of massacres which have involved the destruction of human lives, household 
and social capital, as occurred in Guatemala during the early 1980s, it is not valid to 
argue that this trade-off exists.  In this case the state is part of the problem and not part 




III. Violent conflict and war in Colombia, El Salvador and Guatemala: context and 
specific characteristics 
 
1.  Colombia 
 
Colombia has gone through at least two periods of extreme violence during the past 
decades.  During “la Violencia” (1948-53), more than 145 thousand people were killed 
mostly as a result of rivalry between Liberal and Conservative forces. A military coup 
put an end to this violence in 1953 and in 1957 a caretaker military junta turned power 
over to a coalition formed by liberals and conservatives who then reached an agreement 
to share power by alternating governments for the next 16 years.  
 
Liberals and conservatives mostly abandoned resorting to violence but during the 1960s 
new insurgent movements developed and started to grow gradually, mostly in areas 
where demands for agrarian reform were frustrated.  A decade or two later so called 
paramilitary forces, at first supported or accepted by governments, began to grow as 
organizations defending rural areas from attacks by insurgents.   
 
Conflict was initially a low intensity one confined to rural areas but gradually grew and 
extended its presence in urban centers, as did the links between coca producers and 
traffickers and insurgent and paramilitary groups.  In this process there would appear to 
have been an initial motivation of rebel forces based on grievances linked to land reform 
(sixties and seventies), but then their growth seems to have depended primarily on 
economic opportunities that initially (eighties) were linked to the availability of natural 
resources (including oil and mining) and later, in the nineties, to drug trafficking.
9  
Regions with higher potential rents have then become the most likely regions subject to 
violence and to the continued presence of armed groups. 
 
                                                 
9 PNUD (2003), p. 72 2.  Guatemala and El Salvador 
 
Guatemala shared with El Salvador a dynamic process of economic growth, spurred by 
new export crops that included cotton, sugar cane and beef, and by a small but dynamic 
industrial sector during the sixties and seventies.  At the same time military regimes 
faced strong popular mobilizations during the second half of the sixties and early 
seventies, as well as the creation of broad opposition fronts that participated in elections 
that were rigged.  This resulted in a rather classic example of grievances, mostly 
articulated by urban middle classes, in which civic resistance was severely repressed.   
 
Within this context discontented army officers displaced by the extremely conservative 
anti-communist movement that had overthrown, with United States support, a 
democratically elected government in 1954, founded the first rebel movement in 1962 
in Guatemala.  However, rebel forces were not able to greatly expand and control 
significant areas nor able to take over cities, with the exception of a one day occupation 
of a small provincial capital (Sololá) in 1980.  They never were able to grow beyond a 
typical guerrilla movement concentrated mostly on a tactical harassment of government 
forces, first in the Eastern parts of Guatemala (1966-72) and later (1978-84) mostly in 
the Western highlands.   
 
At the end of the seventies the repressive reaction of the state was massive, no doubt 
influenced by the Sandinista victory in Nicaragua and by the significant threat that the 
insurgent forces represented in El Salvador.  In Guatemala reaction by the state included 
a campaign of selective assassination of leaders of social and political movements in 
urban areas, the forced recruitment of almost one million peasants through the creation 
of civil self defense patrols under the control of the Army, and a series of massacres in 
rural areas as part of the government’s terror campaign.  Rebel forces were basically 
defeated in 1982, though minor groups continued to be active both nationally and 
internationally until 1996, when the Peace Agreements were signed, as they attempted 
to avoid that military defeat might become a decisive political defeat. 
 
Rebel movements were founded in the early seventies in El Salvador, within a context 
of strong confrontations between peasant and organized labor groups on the one hand, 
and the government on the other.  The government increasingly responded with 
repressive policies, including electoral frauds in 1972 and 1977.  Political violence 
increased as army and paramilitary squads killed leaders of social and political 
movements, including the assassination of the archbishop of El Salvador, Oscar 
Romero, in 1980.  This contributed to a growing rebel movement in the late seventies. 
 
Rebel movements united in 1980 and launched a so-called final offensive in 1981.   
Although this offensive failed to spark a national rebellion it demonstrated the strength 
of rebel forces and turned them into the main political opposition force.  From thereon 
they carried out a low-intensity war with strong areas of influence in the north and east 
of El Salvador.  After years of what was basically a de facto stalemate, negotiations 





 III.  The impact of violent conflict in Colombia (1992-2002), El Salvador 
(1979-91) and Guatemala (1980-1990) 
 
Human development, defined as a process of growing options or freedom, involves 
growing capabilities that depend on social development, economic growth and the 
possibility that human beings may individually and collectively define and choose the 
way of life they prefer.  Violent conflict is the opposite of human development, to the 
extent that it reduces freedoms and capabilities through its negative impacts on 
economic and social development while at the same time severely restricting or 
excluding political freedom.  These issues are analyzed in the following sections on the 
basis of available data in the cases of Colombia, El Salvador and Guatemala. 
 
1.  Economic costs 
 
There is a considerable amount of research on countries that have experienced civil 
wars and internal conflict, and it suggests that a typical civil war results in a rate of 
growth around 2.2 percentage points less than during peace, that this type of war lasts 
seven years, and that the cumulative loss of income during the war would be equal to 
around 60% of a year’s GDP.
10  Most studies on the effects of internal conflict in the 
case of Colombia, El Salvador and Guatemala suggest that annual GDP growth rates 
may have been lower than in other regions, though conflicts have been significantly 
longer, thereby resulting in cumulative losses that have been higher.   
 
One set of estimates (based both on accounting methods and simulations) of the yearly 
reduction of GDP as a result of conflict concludes that losses have been the equivalent 
of around 2 percentage points in Colombia,
11 within the range of 0.4 and 1.4 percentage 
points in Guatemala between 1980 and 1990,
12 and between 0.3 and 1.5  points in El 
Salvador.
13   
 
The extended length of the periods analyzed and the fact that the intensity of internal 
conflicts in these countries -and especially in Guatemala and Colombia- varied in 
different periods, makes it difficult to be very precise.  But on the whole, these conflicts 
have been equivalent to not producing at least for a whole year, that is, with 
accumulated losses that have been above 100% of GDP.  Comparing these countries to 
other ones in similar situations but without violent conflicts provides similar 
estimates.
14  An alternative calculation made for El Salvador and Guatemala estimated 
even larger costs, equivalent to more than four times its GDP in Guatemala and more 
than 10 times in El Salvador.
15 
                                                 
10 Wrold Bank (2003) chapter 1, p. 17. 
11 PNUD (2003), p. 110.  There is also a large number of studies on the effect of crime and violent 
conflict on growth in Colombia which  are not part of the mainstream research going on in this area.  See 
Riascos and Vargas, (2004) 
12 Stewart and Humpreys (1997) and CEH (1999) Memoria del Silencio, Tomo IV,  Consecuencias y 
efectos de la violencia, UNOPS, Guatemala, p. 225, table 15. 
13 Stewart and Humphrys (1997) and Stewart, Huang and Wang (2000) 
14 For instance, ranking Guatemala’s position in Latin America on the basis of the growth rates of its 
different sectors in the 1970s and comparing it with its ranking in the 1980s results in Guatemala moving 
down 4 positions in commerce and the industrial sector, 10 in agriculture and 16 in construction.  See 
CEH, p 224. 
15 López (2003)  These estimates appear exaggerated.  The fact that El Salvador’s counterfactual (with 
peace) GDP per capita (PPA dollars 2000, US$ 8,400) would have reached Costa Rica’s level that same  
It is useful to disaggregate costs in order to have a more precise idea of  their nature and 
magnitude.  Those resulting from direct damage tend to be the highest ones.  The 
damage to infrastructure in Colombia, El Salvador and Guatemala was considerable, as 
part of insurgent forces’ strategy to destroy their enemy’s communication and support 
lines, including telecommunications, bridges and roads, together with infrastructure 
linked to the generation of energy and electricity.  Just repairing a destroyed oil pipeline 
in Colombia between 1992 and 1996 was estimated to have cost approximately US$ 4 
billion, and the destruction of electricity installations amounted to US$ 1.5 billion 
during this period.
16  Damage to infrastructure en El Salvador was estimated to be 
approximately US$ 1.6 billion.
17    
 
In these cases the destruction of infrastructure not only reduced incomes as a result of 
infrastructure’s importance as a public good and as a determinant of growth, but also led 
foreign firms to abandon their plans to increase their investments in favor of actual 
disinvestment processes.  Clearly, favorable expectations to invest in legal and 
productive activities disappeared. 
 
In many civil wars both insurgents and government forces loot and destroy housing, 
schools and health facilities.  In the case of Guatemala approximately 170 families were 
the victims of looting and persecution.  In the Northern and Western highlands, and as 
part of a military strategy to terrorize the civilian population,
18 houses of peasant 
families were destroyed together with all their household capital (furniture, clothes, 
working instruments, house appliances, animals, food reserves).
19  This was often part 
of a wider pattern involving not only the destruction of homes but also of churches, 
market places, schools and health centers, as well as the destruction of larger productive 
investment, including that of rural enterprises such as cooperatives or haciendas.   
 
In the case of Colombia both the costs of armed conflict and of widespread crime, 
linked to drug trafficking, must be taken into account. Crimes against private property 
tend to have a greater relative importance in this context, including theft and hold ups.  
The total cost of physical capital, either of communities, enterprises or households 
amounted to approximately 40% of total costs reported in Colombia (table 1).  
 
An often forgotten part of the cost of violent conflict, resulting from the forced 
recruitment of persons, gives rise to a similar proportion of total costs in this country.  
This loss, which takes into account the contribution that these resources made to 
economic growth in the past, should be added to increased military spending and forced 
recruitment.  Neither item involves destruction in itself, though both have a high 
opportunity cost.   
 
Specifically, in the case of Guatemala forced recruitment covered more than 10% of 
total population by involving young men in the countryside in self defense patrols 
                                                                                                                                               
year (US$ 8,650) is most unlikely if account is taken of the fact that Costa Rica’s GDP per capita and its 
social indicators were already significantly superior before El Salvador’s internal conflict began. 
16 Riascos and Vargas (2004) 
17 López, (2003). 
18 This appears to be a common characteristics of civil wars, where “Civilians are targeted mainly because 
the displacement of large fractions of the civilian population reduces the fighting efficiency of the enemy, 
as they cannot hide and obtain support as easily.”  World Bank (2003), p. 18. 
19 CEH, p. 208. controlled by the army.  Apart from devoting a considerable amount of their time to 
patrolling the countryside, thereby having to abandon their regular productive activities, 
organizing them in patrols was also a means of controlling rural population and 
avoiding their becoming part of rebel forces.  This opportunity cost, in addition to the 
additional military expenditure, represented more than half of total calculated costs of 
violent conflict in Guatemala.  Excess of military expenditure accounted for 25% of 
total costs in Colombia.  
 
Table 1 
Composition of reported costs of violent conflict 
in Colombia and Guatemala 
(percentage of total) 
______________________________________________________________________ 
                  Colombia      Guatemala 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Persons killed or disappeared         2.1     7.3 
Displaced persons and refugees      32.8    30.3 
Forced  recruitment          n.a.   47.4 
Kidnapping, robbery, household destruction   26.0      6.0 
Infrastructure       14.1       n.a. 
Excess  military  expenditure     25.0       9.0 
Total                      100.0            100.0 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Source: PNUD, INDH 2003, table 4.4, an CEH, p. 226, table 16. 
 
 
Another significant cost has resulted from internally displaced persons and refugees.  In 
Colombia approximately 2 million persons were refugees or displaced persons in 2002, 
of which approximately 40% were children.
20  In the case of Guatemala refugees and 
displaced persons were mostly part of the approximately 170 thousand families whose 
homes were destroyed in the early eighties, and who represented close to 850 thousand 
persons.  Of these close to 100 thousand were killed or disappeared, 600 thousand were 
internally displaced persons and approximately 150 thousand were refugees who fled 
mostly to neighboring Mexico.
21  Apart from the human suffering involved, the 
economic effect of this displacement, together with the effect of the forced recruitment 
of about a million young men at the time, had a tremendous effect in reducing 
production and incomes, especially in the Northern and Western regions, and mostly in 
the department of Quiché, one of Guatemala’s poorest departments (provinces). 
 
2.  The social development costs 
 
a)  Military expenditure versus social expenditure 
 
Switching public expenditure so as to increase military expenditure is another symptom 
common to all internal conflicts or civil wars.
22  The most common conclusion is that 
this expenditure crowds out both public social expenditure and private investment.   
                                                 
20 PNUD, (2003), p. 1001, Box 4.2. 
21 CEH (1999), p. 205. 
22 Wordl Bank, (2003), p. 14. Evidence of the former effect is clear en the case of Guatemala during the early 1980s, 
when its internal conflict intensified, giving rise to several years (1983-86) during 
which military expenditure was greater than public expenditure on education, a 
phenomenon observed 50 years earlier, before a 16 year old dictatorship was substituted 
by a democratic government.
23 
 
Regarding the Colombian case it has been argued that military expenditure may 
contribute to reduce the destruction of capital stock resulting from internal conflict.  As 
noted earlier, this effect will depend on the nature of the state involved, since this 
expenditure can be a source of destruction and not solely of protection, as was the case in 
Guatemala during the early 1980s.  In the case of Colombia a simulation exercise found 
that during the 1990s a slight increase of military expenditure could contribute to higher 
levels of output, consumption and investment after a transition period during which 
consumption would be lower.
24  This would suggest a trade-off between the positive 
effect of public expenditure on health and education on human development, as opposed 
to an alternative and positive effect of military expenditure that reduces the destruction of 
capital.  Whatever the case, internal conflict still would be giving rise to a situation in 
which public expenditure on health and education would be lower. 
 
b)  The effect of lower economic growth (resulting from violent 
conflict) on human development 
 
Apart from the effect that violent conflict will have on reducing public expenditure on 
health and education, it will also have similar effects via the reduction of household 
income, which will tend to result in adjustments of private expenditure on health and 
education.  Specifically, a study on the economic and social costs of armed conflict in El 
Salvador makes use of elasticities linking changes in social indicators to income 
variations.
25  The social indicators included are infant and child mortality and 
malnutrition, enrolment (primary, secondary and tertiary), illiteracy and telephones.   
 
On the basis of these elasticities it is possible to make estimates of the effect of GDP 
reductions resulting from internal conflict on these social indicators.  Indeed, taking into 
account that two of the three components of the Human Development Index are included 
in these estimations (GDP and education), an additional estimate of the effects of income 
variations on life expectancy changes provides a first idea of the effect of violent conflict 
on the HDI via its effect on the reduction of income.
26 
  
                                                 
23 A graph illustrating this point is found in CEH (1999), p.213.  The historical anlysis of public 
expenditure and on the relative importance of public expenditure on education, helath and defense can be 
found in Sistema de Naciones Unidas, Guatemala: el financiamiento del desarrollo humano, ONDH 2001, 
Guatemala 2001, p. 14-15.  Internal conflict in the 1980s returned Guatemala’s public expenditure 
situation to one similar to the one existing 50 years earlier, in the 1930s. 
24 This approach is explained in the review undertaken by  Riascos and Vargas (2004) 
25  López (2003) 
26 The idea that life expectancy reductions have been mostly the result of preventive medicine associated 
to the germ theory of disease suggests that life expectancy reductions depend only in a relatively minor 
way on growing income (greater income would explain between 15 and 20% of the reduction of life 
expectancy in the United States during the first half of the XXth Century).  See Preston, Samuel H. 
“American Longevity: Past Present, and Future”.  Distinguished Lecturer in Aging Series, No. 7/1996, 
Syracuse Policy Brief. Through these direct and indirect effects the approximate impact of a reduction in income 
of 1% would then be to reduce the value of the IDH by 0.018, as opposed to the case 
when these elasticity effects are not considered, in which the IDH falls by only 0.006.
27   
Furthermore, given the evidence that the destruction of public goods as a result of 
internal conflicts tends to be of greater relative importance in middle income countries –
like Colombia, El Salvador and Guatemala- thereby affecting to a greater degree their 
social development,
28 would mean that their lost human development would be relatively 
greater –given the magnitude of the conflict- than in the case of lower income countries 
affected by internal conflicts. 
 
c)  The direct impact on education 
 
It is especially difficult to have precise estimates of the effect of internal conflict on 
education.  Nevertheless, there is evidence that the more direct effect of violent conflict 
on education has been felt on children that have had to abandon school, either because of 
the forced displacement of families or as a result of education facilities that were 
destroyed or closed down.  In Colombia the rate at which children have abandoned 
school is higher in municipalities in which both insurgents and paramilitary forces are 
present than in other municipalities.
29  Violence is not the only explanation of this 
outcome, but the fact that municipalities in which violence has been increasing are also 
those with greater inequality
30 suggest a vicious circle involving inequality, violence and 
fewer opportunities for education.   
 
The extreme intensification of violent conflict in Guatemala in 1982, when most 
massacres occurred in the countryside, resulted in an absolute reduction of enrolment of 
almost 37 thousand students in primary school, mostly in public schools in rural areas.
31  
Furthermore, since teachers had an important role as community leaders, it is not 
surprising that hundreds were assassinated, thereby weakening further the state’s capacity 
to provide adequate education services. 
 
In the case of El Salvador estimates based on the simulated effect of lower GDP on social 
variables point to a relatively limited impact on education, concentrated mainly on 
secondary and tertiary education.
32  The methodology used in this case clearly has its 
limits, since it is based on an assumed impact of economic considerations on dropping 
out of school that does not take into account specific characteristics of violent conflict, 
especially in rural areas, as the case of Guatemala illustrates. 
 
 
3.  The direct impact on health 
                                                 
27 The elasticities are the following ones: 0.02 for net primary enrolment, 0.32 for net secondary 
enrolment, 0.23 for gross tertiary enrolment and  -0.05 for the illiteracy rate.   See Lopez (2003)  Our own 
estimated elasticity of life expectancy, calculated on the basis of the HDR (excluding 10 outliers) is of 
0.1660, close to Preston’s estimates for the US during the first half of the XXth century.  The relationship 
between income and the HDI and income is affected by its logarithmic nature.    Gustavo Arriola, of 
Guatemala’s NHDR team, calculated these figures and the overall effect on the HDI. 
28 Pottenbaum and  Kanbur (2004) 
29 PNUD (2004), p. 106 
30 Sarmiento (2001) 
31 Whereas 884.8 thousand registered in 1981, only 8481 registered a year later, in spite of a continuously 
growing trend in earlier (and later) years.  See CEH, p.219, table 11. 
32 López (2003).  
It is even more difficult to determine the effect of violent conflict on health.  A first 
indicator is the number of persons that died as a result of violent conflict, as well as the 
number of refugees and –especially- internally displaced persons for whom health 
conditions deteriorated considerably.  In the case of Guatemala it is estimated that 
between 1980 and 1990 approximately 100 thousand persons were killed or disappeared, 
while there were 750 thousand displaced persons, including 150 thousand refugees that 
migrated to Mexico.
33  El Salvador’s civil war cost some 75 thousand lives and displaced 
about 1 million people.
34   
 
In Colombia most studies attempt to distinguish between the effects of criminal violence 
and armed conflict.  From 1998 to 2001 the number of homicides reached approximately 
100 thousand persons, with a rising number of homicides per year, reaching almost 28 
thousand in 2001, of which 27.4% were considered of a political nature.
35  Adjusting life 
expectancy in Colombia to take into account its high homicide rate has led to estimate 




Another indicator results from comparing men and women’s life expectancies.  Since a 
normal difference between men and women would be approximately 4 years, in the case 
of countries subject to violent conflict a greater difference can be attributed to higher 
death rates of men resulting from violence.  Thus, in 2002 the corresponding difference in 
Colombia was of 6.2 years, whereas in both Guatemala and El Salvador, ten years earlier 
(1992) this difference amounted to 4.9; significantly it increased to 5.9 and 6, 
respectively, ten years later, suggesting that violent crime, a legacy of past internal 
conflict, is on the rise.
37   
 
The simulation of the possible effect of GDP’s reduction as a consequence of war in El 
Salvador also led to estimate quite significant increases in infant mortality (from 23 to 29 
per thousand born alive), under-5 mortality (from 27 to 35) and child malnutrition (from 
6 to 12%) as a result of conflict in that country.
38  This suggests similar patterns of either 
deteriorating or very slow progress in health in Colombia at present and during the 
eighties in Guatemala. 
 
4.  From grievance to greed: the costs and legacy of a culture of violence 
.    
Collier and Hoeffler provide evidence suggesting that “greed”, or economic opportunity 
(access to finance provided by extortion of natural resources, or donations from abroad), 
is a better explanation of civil war than “grievances” such as high inequality, lack of 
political rights and ethnic or religious divisions in society.
39    However, violent conflict 
in Colombia, El Salvador and Guatemala suggests that it may be useful to distinguish 
between what originates violent conflict and what sustains it.    In these countries it 
would appear that grievance-fed violent conflict gave rise to a culture of violence and 
                                                 
33 CEH, p. 205 
34 López (2003), The Economic and Social Costs… 
35 PNUD, INDH (2003), p. 105, table 4.2 
36 PNUD, INDH (2003), p. 105. 
37 UNDP Human Development reports of 1995 (table 3.1, p. 85) and of 2004 (table 24, p. 219). 
38 López (2003) 
39 Collier and Hoeffler (2001) lack of respect for the rule of law that facilitated the extension of violence to other 
spheres, opening up spaces for violence based on greed.   
 
This is most obvious in the case of Colombia, where one of the intangible costs of the 
violent conflict originally fed by political motives has been to combine and amplify it 
through its increased link with drug trafficking and crime in general.  It is also part of the 
legacies of internal conflict in both El Salvador and Guatemala, where criminal violence, 
involving actors that in the past participated in these countries’ internal conflict, grew 
rapidly –indeed, exploded- after the signing of their respective Peace Agreements.
40  This 
is part of the destruction of social capital, partly the result of the widespread repression of 
different types of organizations through the assassination of their leaders and by means of 
other terrorist actions, but also through the erosion of values that recognize the 




5.  Distributional consequences 
 
Analysis of the geographical distribution of violent conflict provides some insights 
regarding the relationship between conflict and inequality.  As mentioned above, a study 
on Colombia found a close relationship between the rate of homicides and a 
concentration index of a quality of life indicator in different municipalities, distinguishing 
between municipalities in which violence had increased and those in which it had not, 
and covering two periods: 1985-86 and 1990-96.
41  No relationship was found between 
violence (measured by the homicide rate) and poverty whereas a positive relationship 
between violence, higher income and inequality was found.   
 
This is in accordance with Barrington-Moore’s theory that grievances arising in situations 
in which there is evidence that it is possible to materially cover the needs of those who 
are poorest can be a cause of revolt.  These situations tend to correspond to those existing 
in Central America during the 1960s, when high economic growth rates (with GDP 
growing between 5 and 7% per year) were accompanied by high degrees of inequality.  
This unequal process of economic modernization, coupled with closed political systems 
and slow social development, is the main explanation of wars in El Salvador, Guatemala 
and Nicaragua in the seventies and eighties.  The fact that the same study in Colombia 
found that municipalities with greater levels of education and higher levels of voter 
participation were also among those with lower levels of violence, confirms the 
importance of education and of open democratic systems as deterrents of violence. 
 
Available evidence on Guatemala’s conflict during the 1980s
42 points to it having 
concentrated in a few departments (provinces) and especially in the department of 
Quiché, followed by Huehetenango and Chimaltenango, all of them with a majority of 
                                                 
40 In this context the Peace Agreements are especially important as means to reduce the probability of  
shifting from a violent conflict based mainly on grievances to one based mainly on greed. 
41 Sarmiento (2001) 
42 There was a first wave of violence and insurgency that concentrated mostly in the Eastern, non-
indigenous, part of Guatemala during the sixties and early seventies. indigenous population.
43 These departments also belonged to the regions with the lowest 
IDHs and the highest levels of poverty in 1989.
44 
  
Although Guatemala’s indigenous population accounts for approximately half of total 
population, the indigenous groups were those most affected by violent conflict, including 
massacres, forced recruitment or displacement and destruction of their homes.  The 
extreme nature of repression against indigenous peoples in Guatemala  provides evidence 







































                                                 
43 CEH (1999), p. 216-219 
44 They were not, however, the departments with the greatest concentration of land ownership.  Curiously, 
they are among the departments with the greatest reductions in the land Gini coefficient between 1979 
and 2002.   
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